The Discretionary Function Exception and the
Suits in Admiralty Act: A Safe Harbor for
Negligence?
Congress traditionally has delegated broad discretion to
government agencies carrying out their statutory duties.' This
grant of discretion has immunized certain government actions
from liability.2 The Federal Tort Claims Acts (FTCA) contains
an explicit provision, the discretionary function exception," that
shelters all "discretionary" acts from judicial scrutiny, regardless
of whether they are negligent or otherwise. This provision is not
present in the Suits in Admiralty Act 5 (SIA). Nevertheless, several circuit courts have questioned whether to impute certain
exceptions of FTCA into the SIA. This issue arises from the
1960 amendments to the SIA allowing admiralty suits against
1. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT (1972). Davis states, "Congress may and
does lawfully delegate power to administrative agencies, and it may and does lawfully
delegate to such agencies the much more dangerous power to make law and to exercise
discretion in cases involving identified parties." Id. at 26. An example of a broad Congressional grant of discretion to an agency is seen in 14 U.S.C. § 2 (1977), which
describes the primary duties of the Coast Guard. They include (a) enforcement and
assistance in the enforcement of federal laws on the high seas, (b) administration, promulgation and enforcement of regulations for the promotion of safety on the seas on all
matters not delegated to other executive departments, (c) development, establishment,
maintenance and operation of aids to navigation, icebreaking facilities and rescue missions, (d) engaging in oceanographic research, and (e) maintenance of a state of readiness
to function in the Navy during war.
2. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). These statutory exceptions to liability prevent
individuals from bringing suit against the United States on these grounds. See notes 4,
19 infra.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) authorizes suits
against the United States for tort claims caused by the negligent or wrongful acts or
omissions of its employees acting within the scope of employment. The FTCA's scope is
limited, however, by several exceptions that allow the government to retain sovereign
immunity in certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). For the FTCA's text and
related discussion, see notes 16-21 and accompanying text infra.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). This exception, like the others in § 2680, limits the government's liability when certain circumstances are present. The discretionary function
exception provides that § 1346 does not apply to claims "based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the government." Id. § 2680(a).
5. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). The Suits in Admiralty Act (SIA) allows proceedings in
personam against the United States for injuries caused on the water in the same manner
as if a private individual were responsible. For the SIA's text and related discussion, see
notes 9-15 infra.
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the United States if the plaintiff could maintain a suit against a
private individual. e Thus, the amendments substantially broadened the federal government's amenability to suit. To avoid this
newly imposed liability, the government has asked courts to
apply the FTCA's limitations of liability, particularly the discretionary function exception, to the SIA. The First and Seventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals have accepted the government's argument. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits, however, have refused to
apply these limitations to the SIA absent a clear expression of
congressional intent.8
This comment will examine first the FTCA and the SIA and
their legislative histories. Further, this comment will focus on
the different circuits' responses to the issue of whether the SIA
should be read in light of the discretionary function exception.
This examination will expose the insufficiency of the First and
Seventh Circuits' rationale for implying the FTCA exceptions
into the SIA. This comment will conclude that the 4th and 5th
Circuits' approach best follows congressional intent, sound rules

of statutory construction, and avoids the adverse effects of
imputation of the FTCA exception into the SIA.

With the advent of World War I and government entry into
the otherwise privately owned merchant shipping business, Congress decided to remove the sovereign immunity barrier for
those injured in the course of governmental shipping activities.9
6. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). Congress amended the SIA in 1960 to allow all claims in
admiralty against the United States to be maintained, rather than only actions involving
government cargo and government merchant vessels, which the original SIA permitted.
For the text and discussion of this amendment, see notes 12-15 and 114-19 and accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g., Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1980); Gercey v. United
States, 540 F.2d 536 (1st Cir. 1976). See notes 22-42 and accompanying text infra.
8. See, e.g., Lane v. United States, 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975); De Bardeleben
Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971). See notes 56-83 infra.
9. For an excellent summary of the pre-1960 SIA background based upon legislative
history, see De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir.
1971). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "Congress felt that the liability of the
Government should be coextensive with that of private shipowners and shippers who
theretofore had been primary participants in merchant shipping." Id.
Another source of information on the historical background is G. GE.MoRE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW

O

ADMIRALTY

(2d. ed. 1975). The authors trace the government's

entrance into the shipping business and eventual waiver of sovereign immunity to the
United States' participation in the two World Wars. Id. at 980-83. At various times, the
United States assumed roles previously undertaken by private individuals. For example,
during World War II, the government entered the field of marine insurance through the
War Shipping Administration because of private underwriters' reluctance to write war
risk insurance. d. at 981. With the increased government participation in the shipping
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Enacting the SIA in 1920,10 Congress authorized suits against
the United States only in cases involving government merchant
vessels and cargo "where if such vessel. . . or if such cargo were
privately owned . . . a proceeding in admiralty could be main-

tained."'" Problems arose, however, as to jurisdiction and proper
interpretation of the statute,

2

prompting Congress in 1960 to

business, i.e. "owner, demise charterer, shipper, underwriter, employer, etc., etc.," there
came the waiver of sovereign immunity, subjecting the United States to the same liability as a private individual in admiralty. Id. at 982-83.
10. Suits in Admiralty Act of 1920 (SIA), ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525-28 (1920), codified at
46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1976).
11. The full text of the section reads:
That in cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or such
cargo were privately owned and possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be
maintained at the time of the commencement of the action herein provided
for, a libel in personam may be brought against the United States or against
such corporation, as the case may be, provided that such vessel is employed as
a merchant vessel or is a tugboat operated by such corporation. Such suits
shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the district in
which the parties so suing, or any of them, reside or have their principal place
of business in the United States, or in which the vessel or cargo charged with
liability is found. The libellant shall forthwith serve a copy of his libel on the
United States attorney for such district and mail a copy thereof by registered
mail to the Attorney General of the United States, and shall file a sworn return
of such service and mailing. Such service and mailing shall constitute valid
service on the United States and such corporation. In case the United States or
such corporation shall file a libel in rem or in personam in any district, a crosslibel in personam may be filed or a set-off claimed against the United States or
such corporation with the same force and effect as if the libel had been filed by
a private party. Upon application of either party the cause may, in the discretion of the court, be transferred to any other district court of the United
States.
Id., ch. 95, §2.
12. See generally S. RE. No. 1894, 86 Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in 119601 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 3583. The Senate Report accompanying the 1960 amendments
states that the primary purpose of the amendments was to clarify jurisdictional
problems. Id. According to the Report, federal district courts in admiralty had exclusive
jurisdiction over claims involving government merchant vessels under the SIA but under
The Public Vessels Act (PVA), 43 Stat. 1112-13 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 781-90 (1976) and
the Tucker Act (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976)), cases involving public vessels
had different jurisdictional requirements. S. RwE. No. 1894, 86th Cong. 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3583, 3584. Due to hazy distinctions
between "merchant" and "public" vessel status, plaintiffs were often left in confusion as
to where to file a claim. Id. Accord, N. HEALY & B. Culi, AnmirALTY 863 (1965 ed.)
("almost as disturbing as the dismissals for want of 'jurisdiction' was the mass of litigation over whether a particular vessel was a 'public vessel' or was 'employed as a
merchant vessel' ").
The jurisdictional provisions of the Public Vessels Act and the Tucker Act caused
additional confusion. Under the Public Vessels Act, the United States district courts in
admiralty have exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages caused by a public vessel
of the United States, and for compensation for towage and salvage services, including
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take steps to remedy these difficulties,1 3 resulting in a substantial broadening of the scope of governmental liability for maritime claims." As amended, the SIA now encompasses all maritime claims, not just those involving government merchant
vessels and cargo, if the same claim could be brought against a
private individual.15
Between the 1920 enactment of the SIA and the 1960
amendments, Congress passed the FTCA, waiving sovereign
immunity for tort claims arising from the negligent or wrongful
acts of federal government employees.1 6 The Supreme Court

noted that the FTCA "was not an isolated and spontaneous
contract salvage, rendered to a public vessel of the United States. 46 U.S.C. §781 (1976).
The Tucker Act, however, provides concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts and the
Court of Claims for civil action[s] or claim[s] against the United States, not exceeding
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort ....
" 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2) (1976). Therefore, since determining the character of
the claims asserted was as difficult as ascertaining the status of the vessel involved, misfilings occurred. The Report also noted that misfilings often were disastrous due to differing statutes of limitation; the limit for the Tucker Act was six years, while the SIA
and PVA provided for a two-year limit. S. REP. No. 1894; 86th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted
in [19601 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3583, 3584. Examples of these jurisdictional
dilemmas the Report cited were: Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446 (1953);
Aliotti v. United States, 221 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1955); Eastern S.S. Lines v. United
States, 187 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1951). The 1960 amendments, which allow for transfer of
cases, were intended to ensure that filing suit in the wrong court would not shorten or
lengthen the applicable statute of limitations. S. REP. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Seas.,
reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3583.
13. The congressional cure for these problems was the Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L.
No. 86-770, 74 State. 912. The bill included three sections: section 1 amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406 by adding a subsection (c); section 2 added § 1506 to follow the new section, and
section 3 amended the SIA, 46 U.S.C. § 742, by amending the first sentence of section 2
of the 1920 Act. For text and further discussion of these amendments, see notes 115-18
and accompanying text infra.
14. De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 145 (5th Cir. 1971).
15. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). The SIA reads, in pertinent part, "in cases where if such
vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could
be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought
against the United States.
... (added emphasis indicates amended wording). Id.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). The statute provides for:
claims against the United States ... for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his employment,
under the circumstances where . . . a private person would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
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flash of congressional generosity"17 but rather the result of thirty
years of congressional debate over the justness of sovereign
immunity.' Unlike the SIA, Congress expressly limited the
waiver of sovereign immunity from tort claims by enumerating
specific exceptions based on particular policy considerations.' 9
17. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950). The decision determined three
individual claims, each injury resulting from the negligence of armed forces members.
The issue in each was whether the FTCA provided a remedy for those sustaining injury
"incident to service." Noting Congress' intent in the FTCA was to mitigate the unjust
consequences of sovereign immunity and provide a remedy to those who had been without, the Court nevertheless disallowed government liability for the soldiers' injuries, reasoning that the government was liable only in instances where a private individual would
be. Id. at 140. Since there was no analogous liability of a private individual for injuries
sustained while in the armed forces, the Court would not find the government liable. Id.
at 146.
18. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1955) (one of the first Supreme
Court interpretations of the FTCA). The Court examined legislative history preceding
the Act, which expressed the long-felt desire that the "[g]overnment should assume the
obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work." Id.
at 24. Ironically, the Court denied jurisdiction under the FTCA because the discretionary
function exception precluded the claim.
Legislative history indicates that another contributing factor leading to the enactment of the FTCA applied on more practical grounds. An increasing number of bills
were bombarding Congress requesting compensation for government-caused injuries and
damages. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Seas. p. 2. The House Report states:
In the Sixty-eighth Congress about 2,200 private claim bills were introduced, of
which 250 became law then the largest number in the history of the claims
committee.
In the Seventieth Congress 2,268 private claim bills were introduced, asking more than $100,000,000. Of these, 336 were enacted, appropriating about
$2,830,000, of which 144, in the amount of $562,000, were for tort.
In each of the Seventy-fourth and Seventy-fifth Congresses over 2,300 private bills were introduced, seeking more than $100,000,000. In the Seventysixth Congress approximately 2,000 bills were introduced, of which 315 were
approved, for a total of $826,000.
In the Seventy-seventh Congress, of the 1,829 private claim bills introduced and referred to the Claims Committee, 593 were approved for a total of
$1,000,253.30. In the Seventy-eighth Congress 1,644 bills were introduced; 549
of these approved for a total of $1,355,767.12.
Therefore, in an effort to avoid the inefficient procedure of passing thousands of individual private claim bills, Congress authorized suit against the United States in U.S. district
courts.
In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Court found, via legislative history, that "[t]he volume of these private bills, the inadequacy of congressional machinery
for determination of facts, the importunities to which claimants subjected members of
Congress, and the capricious results, led to a strong demand that claims for tort wrongs
be subjected to adjudication." Id. at 140.
19. These exceptions are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). They include (a) the
discretionary function exception, (b) claims based on transmission of letters or postal
matters, (c) claims with respect to custom taxes or retention of goods by customs officers,
(d) claims based on admiralty jurisdiction, (e) claims arising out of the administration of
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The discretionary function exception, precluding liability for
claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function. . . whether or not
the discretion involved be abused,"'2 0 has been a source of constant controversy.2 1 Never adequately defined, the discretionary
Title 50, (f) damages incurred by quarantines imposed by the United States, (g)
(repealed), (h) claims based on assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contract relations, (i) damages caused by the Treasury's fiscal regulations, (j)
claims based on combatant activities during war, (k) claims arising in a foreign country,
(1) claims based on the TVA's activities, (m) claims arising from the Panama Canal Company, and (n) activities and claims due to the activities of the Federal land bank, intermediate credit bank, or bank for cooperatives. For a discussion of the policy considerations underlying the discretionary function exception, see notes 43-55 and accompanying
text infra.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
21. Commentators criticize because of its imprecise nature and difficulties in determining situations in which it is applicable. See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS
(1956 ed.); Reynolds, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 57 GRO. L. REv. 81 (1968); Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act: a Proposed Construction of the DiscretionaryFunction Exception, 31 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1956). Courts
and commentators continually struggle to define precisely what constitutes a discretionary function, concocting various standards to achieve a workable definition. See, e.g.,
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (the Court applied the "Good
Samaritan rule" to the government, which provides that once one undertakes to warn
the public of danger, he must do so in a careful manner); Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1933) (the Court stated that the discretionary function exception includes
actions of executors and administrators in planning activities, but does not include acts
of subordinates carrying out government operations); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950) (the Court distinguished between governmental and proprietary functions).
The Washington Supreme Court has devised four questions relevant in determining
the existence of a discretionary function under Washington's discretionary function
exception. In Evangelical United Brethren v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440
(1965), the court offered the following test:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic
governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the questioned act, omission,
or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would not change the course or
direction of the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omission, or
decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and the
expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved? (4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or
lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, omission, or
decision?
Id. at 255, 407 P.2d at 445.
Others criticize the courts' extension of the exception into areas not truly involving
discretionary functions while failing to protect functions that do involve discretion. See,
e.g., James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the DiscretionaryFunction Exception:
The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 184 (1957). James
contends the exception has overtaken the Act, in importance, and has extended the Act
beyond its original purpose. One court suggests the discretionary fuhction exception is a
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function exception shields the negligent acts of government officials from liability if the injuries resulted from the exercise of
broad discretion entrusted to the government employee. This
provision precipitated the conflict between the First and Seventh Circuits and the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, because the
government urged judicial extension of this exception to the

SIA.

Gercey v. United States22 best illustrates the First Circuit
approach to this issue. The decedent's parents brought a wrongful death action under the SIA against the United States, alleging the Coast Guard negligently failed to adopt a comprehensive
program designed to notify the public of vessels failing to meet
certain safety standards.2 3 In Gercey, the only action the Coast
Guard had taken was removal of Coast Guard certificates from
such vessels.2 ' The court recognized that the decision whether to
institute a comprehensive program was within the Coast Guard's
discretion.2 The court based this decision on a reading of 46
U.S.C. § 391a 2 and § 391,2 7 mandating only that the Coast
superfluous addition to the FTCA, reflecting excessive congressional caution. Kendrick v.
United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1949). Given these criticisms of the exception,
which has been described by Harper and James as an "ill-conceived and poorly
thoughtout attempt to solve some of the most sensitive problems concerning the proper
limits of governmental liablity," 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, note 21 supra, § 29.15, various
commentators have proposed new constructions for the discretionary function exception.
Peck suggests shifting the burden of proof to the government to demonstrate that a
discretionary function actually was involved. Peck, note 21 supra, at 225. The court in
King v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974), used this approach. For the state
to be entitled to the protection of discretionary immunity, it had to show that the policy
decision of refusing to issue a building permit to plaintiffs involved a conscious balancing
of risks and advantages. Merely alleging that the act was a discretionary function was
insufficient. Id. at 246, 525 P.2d at 233. An adequate solution is yet to be found.
22. 540 F.2d 536 (1st Cir. 1976).
23. Id. at 537. Plaintiffs listed several actions the Coast Guard could have taken to
enhance public safety, including: (1) informing the public of vessels deemed unsafe
through either a public notice or a sign placed on the vessel; (2) periodically checking to
determine whether such vessels are operating despite decertification; (3) informing any
purchaser of the vessel's condition; and (4) notifying all local Coast Guard units of decertified vessels. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 538.
26. 46 U.S.C. § 390a (1976) provides that:
The Secretary shall, at least once every three years, cause to be inspected each
passenger-carrying vessel, and shall satisfy himself that every such vessel (1) is
of a structure suitable for the service in which it is to be employed; (2) is
equipped with the proper appliances for lifesaving and fire protection in accordance with applicable laws, or rules and regulations prescribed by him; (3) has
suitable accommodations for passengers and the crew; and (4) is in a condition
to warrant the belief that it may be used, operated, and navigated with safety
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Guard make some periodic inspections of vessels, leaving the

precise method to the Coast Guard's discretion. Thus, the court
found no express or implied duty in the Coast Guard to implement procedures suggested by plaintiffs as more effective.2 8 The

court characterized the Coast Guard's decision as a basic policy
judgment for which Congress designed the discretionary function exception. 0

Thus, despite the absence of an express discretionary function exception in the SIA, the Gercey court found that sound
principles required imputing the discretionary function exception.3 0 Without this immunity for decision-making, the court
reasoned, independent judicial review would disrupt all legisla-

31
tive and administrative decisions involving the public interest.

to life in the proposed service and that all applicable requirements of marine
safety statutes and regulations thereunder are faithfully complied with.
27. 46 U.S.C. § 391 (1976), in pertinent part, provides:
The head of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating shall
require the Coast Guard to inspect before the same shall be put into service,
and at least once in every year thereafter, the hull of every steam vessel carrying passengers; to determine to its satisfaction that every such vessel so submitted to inspection is of a structure suitable for the service in which she is to
be employed, has suitable accomodations for passengers and the crew, and is in
a condition to warrant the belief that she may be used in navigation, with
safety to life, and that the vessel is in full compliance with the applicable
requirements of this title or Acts amendatory or supplementary thereto and
regulations thereunder; and if deemed expedient, to direct the vessel to be put
in motion or to adopt any other suitable means to test her sufficiency and that
of her equipment.
28. 540 F.2d at 538.
29. The court cited Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d Cir. 1974), for
the proposition that the discretionary function exception includes, and probably should
be limited to, "policy judgments as to the public interest." 540 F.2d at 539. The Third
Circuit nonetheless found no discretionary function in Griffin; instead, the court found
the government negligent in its implementation of a policy decision. Implementation
negligence, according to the Supreme Court in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61 (1955), is not excused through the discretionary function exception. For a discussion of Indian Towing, see notes 71-73 infra.
30. While recognizing that the earlier Fifth Circuit decision, De Bardeleben, concluded differently in dictum, the court nonetheless rejected the case solely on the basis
of a footnote. In De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.
1971), the court dealt not with the discretionary function exception, but with another
FTCA exception. Analogizing, however, the court reasoned that importing FTCA exceptions would produce "obviously unintended and irrational distinctions." Id. at 146 n.15
(citations omitted). Because it disagreed with the underlying factual premise, although in
dictum, the Gercey court dismissed the De Bardeleben conclusion that none of the
FTCA exceptions should be read into the SIA. Thus, because of a single premise in a
single footnote, Gercey failed to deal with another line of reasoning regarding the importation of FTCA exceptions into the SIA.
31. 540 F.2d at 539. The court recognized that implementation of any policy deci-
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Without explaining why, the court stated that such interference
would create "an intolerable state of affairs."3 2 Thus, the court
refused to consider whether the Coast Guard was liable for its
failure to adopt a comprehensive program to protect the public
from unsafe vessels." Another First Circuit Court held similarly,
recognizing the need to protect agency policy-making in the
future.3 4 After reviewing the split in the circuits, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the First Circuit's approach.
In Bearce v. United States, 5 plaintiffs brought an action under
the SIA to recover for the wrongful death of a speedboat operator who struck a Shore Arm Extension." Plaintiffs argued that
the Coast Guard negligently failed to provide any lighting to
sion would inevitably lead to private injuries. Therefore, given the government's inability
to prevent all injuries, certain governmental decisions deserved protection from judicial
review. Id.
32. Id.
33. Despite the court's reluctance to interfere with agency decision-making, it nevertheless suggested that given the "magnitude of th[e] tragedy," measures short of plaintiff's proposed system might, at little cost, avert some disasters. Id. at 539 n.3. It suggested that if Coast Guard stations were advised of recently decertified passenger vessels,
officials might recognize obvious violations within their surveillance areas. Id. This was
precisely one of plaintiff's suggestions. Concluding, the court expressed its hope that feasible means of lessening the likelihood of the recurrence of the events before it be found.
Id. It is ironic that after refusing to consider areas within the Coast Guard's discretion,
the court nevertheless offered its insights regarding better procedures the Coast Guard
could utilize.
34. Chute v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 173 (D. Mass. 1978). The claim in Chute
arose from the deaths of two passengers on a boat that collided with a submerged wreck.
The plaintiffs claimed the government was negligent for improperly marking the wreck;
the government asserted that the decision how, not whether, to mark the wreck was
within its discretion, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976), and thus, was protected by the
discretionary function exception. Id. 449 F. Supp. at 183.
Although it concurred with the Gercey court in finding that the discretionary func-.
tion exception should be implied in the SIA, the court nonetheless distinguished the
case, finding it dealt with a policy decision not to act, whereas Chute involved implementation of a policy decision already made. Id. at 185. Relying on Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) and Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d
631 (4th Cir. 1951), the court found the discretionary function exception inapplicable
and the government negligent in inducing public reliance. 449 F. Supp. at 181. The court
concluded that the government was liable for its failure to exercise due care by using a
buoy insufficient to warn mariners of the wreck. Id. at 182. Thus, while dictum, Chute
supports the Gercey holding.
35. 614 F.2d 556 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 112 (1980).
36. Bearce, an experienced sailor, was operating his boat in the Chicago harbor of
Lake Michigan. The harbor is comprised of a series of breakwaters having only one light
to guide boaters. Plaintiff was attempting to navigate through this secondary, less used
entrance. Bearce was killed instantly when he mistakenly believed he had cleared the
breakwater. Id. at 557-58.
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prevent collisions with the breakwater. 7 Although the Coast
Guard had previously attended public hearings and consequently recommended placing a red flashing light on the end of
the Shore Arm Extension, it never acted on this recommendation.38 The government claimed the acts were part of their discretionary duty and protected by the discretionary function
exception." The Bearce court agreed with the Gercey reasoning
and therefore, did not hold the government liable for its failure
to install the light 4" The Bearce court stated that, despite the
absence of any express discretionary function exception, basic
policy considerations, such as budgetary concerns and administrative independence, prohibited the broad waiver of immunity
plaintiffs asserted."1 To bolster their decision, the court also
noted that the purpose of the 1960 amendments was to clear up
only, not to expand the scope of governjurisdictional confusion
2
mental liability.'

The First and Seventh Circuits' premise for applying the
discretionary function exception to the SIA is that government
37. The court did not address the question of whether the government indeed was
negligent because it found that the discretionary function exception protected the government's failure to provide other lighting. The Bearce court relied upon the Gercey
court-a court that also avoided the negligence issue for the same reason. Id. at 559.
38. The Illinois Boat Council held the meetings in 1966. Id. at 558. At this time,
there was concern for navigational safety in the harbor. Following the meetings, the
Coast Guard issued a report noting that the color of the exterior breakwater's light
should be changed from white to green and that a red flashing light should be installed.
The Coast Guard acted only on the first recommendation. The court characterized this
decision as one made at the administrative level and, as such, falling within the discretionary function exception. Id. at 558, 560-61.
39. The government relied on 14 U.S.C. § 81 (1976): "in order to aid navigation and
to prevent disasters, collisions and wrecks of vessels and aircraft, the Coast Guard may
establish, maintain, and operate aids to maritime navigation required to serve the needs
of the armed forces or of the commerce of the United States." 614 F.2d at 558-60.
40. 614 F.2d at 558-61. In fact, after characterizing the decision as a discretionary
function, the court refused to review the decision at all-in effect letting the government
off without compensating the plaintiffs.
41. The government's evidence at trial showed a priority list, with approved construction totalling $300,000,000 that Congress had not yet funded. In view of these monetary concerns, the court held that allocations of these limited funds were policy judgments within the scope of the discretionary function exception. Id. at 561.
42. The court cited the Supreme Court opinion in United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976), for the proposition that the SIA 1960 amendment was solely jurisdictional. 614 F.2d at 559. Thus, the court found that the broad
interpretation of the Act eliminating the FTCA exceptions to liability under the SIA
should be avoided. But see notes 120-23 infra. The court failed, however, to explain why
it avoided a broad interpretation of the Act, yet permitted a Strict reading of the amendments to demonstrate the SIA's limited purposes. Id. at 559-60.
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agencies must allocate their limited resources to those activities
that best promote the public interest. 3 Allocation of these
resources involves careful consideration and delicate balancing
of numerous factors. Given these limitations, the public cannot
expect the government to adopt all programs regardless of
expected costs and benefits." Thus, it is within the agency's discretion to evaluate its goals in light of limited funds, equipment
and manpower. 45 Agency expertise and judicial inability to
investigate and weigh fully all pertinent factors in highly specialized areas convinced the First and Seventh Circuits that
courts would be engaging in ineffectual second-guessing of the
wisdom of executive and legislative conduct.
Although not explicitly stated, both Bearce and Gercey's
assertion that the discretionary function exception should apply
to the SIA is rooted in the separation of powers concept. Noted
commentators have defined this doctrine a "constitutional
43. Id. The Gercey court stated that a determination to commit the Coast Guard's
limited resources to the follow-up system the plaintiffs suggested involved consideration
of numerous factors: the effectiveness of present measures, the degree of extra protection
the alternative program offered, whether the increased protection warranted the commitment of limited resources, and the program's effect on other activities the agency sponsored. Id. at 561 n.9. Similar concerns were discussed in United States v. Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp., 372 F.2d 189 (lst Cir. 1967). The court, in deciding whether to hold
the government liable for its negligent towing of the plaintiff's vessel, considered the
amount of equipment available, how much money could be spent, and how much money
Congress would appropriate. The court found no governmental obligation to have particular vessels available or have on board any particular equipment. Id. at 195.
The Bearce court echoed these sentiments, stressing that the allocation of funds for
new navigational aids in the public interest was strictly discretionary especially given the
reality of being able to implement only a limited number of aids. 614 F.2d at 561.
The court in Magno v. Corros, 630 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1980), although not discussing
the discretionary function exception, did state that courts should be aware of budgetary
considerations when dealing with alleged abuses of discretion. Id. at 229. Given the
expense involved in lighting every obstruction, the court felt that it was improper for the
courts to tell the Coast Guard how to spend its limited resources. Id. It felt that this
would unnecessarily divert funds that should go to other regulatory activities. Id.
44. See Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d Cir. 1974) (in considerations involving public policy, agencies utilize a cost-benefit analysis to determine
whether a certain program should be implemented); Offshore Transport Corp. v. United
States, 465 F. Supp. 976, 980 (E.D. La. 1979) (imposition of an expensive course of conduct on the government over an extended period imposes an unreasonable burden).
45. See Reynolds, supra note 21, at 122. Reynolds notes that in areas of policymaking, courts are not well suited to the task of determining whether an agency has
made a mistake and whether the mistake was unreasonable. Id. He suggests it is only by
hindsight that a sound judgment can be made. "The judiciary is designed for deciding
individual cases, laying down general rules, and necessarily considering social and economic factors to some extent. It cannot launch full-scale investigations and studies. . . ." Id.
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arrangement for limiting power through diffusion of authority
among various units of the government: the allocation of powers
among the three branches of the national government.""" This
constitutional allocation 7 not only vests certain powers in the

judicial, legislative, and executive branches, but is designed to
protect the integrity and autonomy of each branch."8 A constitutional keystone,"9 it provides the basis for courts' reluctance to
review the propriety of actions committed to coordinate govern-

ment branches. Each branch should be free to "plan, experiment

and negotiate"5 without fear of disruptive interference from
others. Thus, it follows that the judicial branch should limit the
46. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 400 (9th ed. 1975). The framers of the U. S.
Constitution, influenced by their revolutionary attitude toward England where centralized power resulted in tyranny, and by political theorists, deliberately provided for such
allocation. Until the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court strictly adhered to this
separation notion by strictly limiting each branch solely "to the exercise of the powers
appropriate to its department and no other." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191
(1880). Some members of the Supreme Court, however, subsequently have diverged from
a strict separation of powers mode. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), Justice Brandeis stated, "The separation of the powers of government did not make each branch completely autonomous. It left each, in some measure, dependent upon the others, as it left to each power to exercise, in some respects,
functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial."
47. U.S. CONSTrrUTON art. 1, § 1 provides: "All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives." Article 2, § 1 reads: "The executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America." Article 3, § 1 provides: "The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
48. See L. TRaNE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978). Tribe notes that the integrity and independence of each branch operates to safeguard their interdependence
"without which independence can become domination." Id. at 15. Thus, the framework
serves dual purposes: it enables several sometimes antagonistic government forces to
mesh in order to operate a government made up of many states, while also checking each
branch to inhibit institutional oppression of the citizenry. Id.
49. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Supreme Court referred to
the separation of powers as "at the heart of the Constitution." Id. at 119. James Madison
articulated the importance of separation of powers in Federalist Paper Number 48.
Madison stated that "the powers properly belonging to one of the departments of government ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other
departments." THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison).
50. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 121. Reynolds states that separation of powers is
advanced for the continuance of discretionary immunity. He says that lawsuits based on
alleged administerial and legislative mistakes will inevitably cause harassment of officials, wasted time in preparation for and participation in courtroom battles, and overcautious actions with an eye toward the courtroom. Id. Because some unsatisfactory choices
are inevitable, he views the reasonable person test as an inappropriate standard against
which to measure government actions. Id. The possible liabilities flowing from "judicial
interference" are reductions in freedom, independence, and efficiency.
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scope if its examination of agency decision-making function. The
discretionary function exception preserves the separation of
powers by insuring limited judicial inquiry when responsibility
for basic policy decisions resides in other branches."1
In addition to the separation of powers argument, courts

and commentators suggest that, unless limited by the discretionary immunity doctrine, compensation for government negligence
will place a huge burden on the public treasury, resulting in

inefficient operation of the government and contravening a
2
strong public interest in maintaining government solvency.5
Proponents of discretionary immunity envision great impracticalities arising from computing damages and providing relief on
such a large scale.' Cloaking discretionary acts with immunity
minimizes this burden." Commentators further argue that
potential litigation and subsequent damages awards encourage
agency inaction by making agencies overly cautious in implementing programs designed for the public good." These policy

considerations have convinced the First and Seventh Circuits to

51. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). The
Johnson court held that the parole officer's decision not to warn plaintiff of the risks
presented by accepting a young parolee into her home did not come within the discretionary function's sphere requiring judicial restraint in reviewing such agency decisions.
Id. at 797, 447 P.2d at 363, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
52. See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957). In Rayonier, plaintiffs
sued for losses allegedly caused by the negligence of United States employees in allowing
a forest fire to start on government land and in failing to act with due care to put it out.
The government claimed that if the courts held it responsible for all negligence of the
Forest Service, an unwieldy burden would be placed on the public treasury. Id. at 319.
The court refused to accept this argument, seeing the burden more easily shouldered by
the United States than by the individual. Id. at 320. See also Reynolds, supra note 21, at
123. But see notes 105-08 infra.
53. See, e.g., K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIv LAW TREATISE (1958). Davis, without explanation, states that the machinery necessary to compute damages and provide relief will
be too extensive and that it is better to have some losses go uncompensated. Id. § 25.13.
As he sees it, "harms of this kind [uncompensated losses] have to be regarded as one of
the necessary costs of living in organized society." Id. It would seem, however, that during the government's long history of liability for injuries it causes, some machinery has
been developed to deal with the damages issue. Courts routinely determine damages, and
the government to date has not become bankrupt from paying money judgments. See
also note 108 infra.
54. "The Government each day makes decisions that conceivably could cause huge
losses to millions of people. The possibility of so great a burden will be removed if major
decisions requiring much discretion remain cloaked with immunity." Reynolds, supra
note 21, at 123.
55. "The possibility of suit for every move creates an atmosphere of fear and pressure in which certain government employees must each day make many decisions affecting countless persons." Reynolds, supra note 21, at 121.
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impute the FTCA discretionary function exception into the SIA.
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits, however, have taken a position directly contrary to the First and Seventh Circuits' by
refusing to read the SIA in light of the FTCA exceptions. Begin6 the
ning with De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States,5
Fifth Circuit held that none of the FTCA exceptions could be
imputed into the SIA.57 There, the government admitted its negligent publication of a nautical chart, upon which the injured
plaintiff had relied, but claimed immunity under an FTCA
exception that disallowed claims for government misrepresentation . Although plaintiffs sued under the SIA, the government
argued that Congress had intended to import the FTCA exceptions into the SIA.9 After extensive analysis of the SIA's legislative history, the court concluded there was no support for the
government's inferences' and that this interpretation would only
56. 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971). Plaintiffs brought suit against the United States for
damages resulting when they dropped anchor and inadvertently ruptured a natural gas
pipeline. The explosion damaged plaintiff's tug and barge and injured the tug's mate. Id.
at 141. Plaintiff had relied on a government-published chart that did not reflect the
presence of the pipeline. Id. at 141-42. Although the government later revised the faulty
chart, plaintiffs had no knowledge of these later changes. Id.
57. Id. at 145-46.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) provides in part that § 1346(b) of the FTCA shall not apply
to claims based on government misrepresentation. Subsection (h) also applies to actions
based on interference with contract relations. Canadian Transport Co. v. United States,
430 F. Supp. 1168 (D.D.C. 1977), dealt with this provision in relation to the SIA. The
court, after reviewing plaintiffs' claim for damages based on the Coast Guard's refusal to
allow them entry into port, assumed that FTCA § 2680(h) should not be read into the
SIA. Id. at 1170. Thus, the court found that if plaintiffs were to have a cause of action
based on contract interference, the action had to be maintained under the SIA, which
waived sovereign immunity in this area, rather than the FTCA, which immunized such
government conduct. Id. Canadian Transport, therefore, also lends support to the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits' interpretation of the 1960 amendment to the SIA.
59. 451 F.2d at 145.
60. Id. at 143-46. The court found several reasons why the government's arguments
were unpersuasive: the statutory language itself, legislative history, and the liberal attitude toward waivers of sovereign immunity. Id. at 145. The court, realizing that there
was no express purpose to waive immunity in the 1960 amendments, nevertheless found
such a purpose given the clear import of the statute's language. The court reasoned that
if clarification of the old statute were the sole purpose of the amendments, simply by
defining the ambiguous terms, i.e. "merchant," "public vessel and cargo," would have
accomplished it. As seen by the statute, Congress did more than merely explain what
each term meant. See notes 114-19 infra and notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
The court summarized its reasons for not importing the FTCA exceptions into the
SIA by quoting Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957), wherein the
Supreme Court found "no justification for this Court to read exemptions into the Act
[FTCA] beyond those provided by Congress. If the Act is to be altered that is a function
for the same body that adopted it." 451 F.2d at 146.
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reinject the confusion the 1960 amendments eliminated." Given
the statute's broad waiver of immunity, the court could find no
basis for limiting the SIA in the absence of substantial evidence
that this was indeed Congress' intent.
The Fourth Circuit applied the De Bardeleben reasoning
four years later in Lane v. United States.e In Lane, plaintiff's
boat sank when it unwittingly ran into a sunken barge. 6" Plaintiff claimed the United States was negligent in failing to mark
the wreck; the government claimed the discretionary function
exception protected its decision not to act because the controlling statute made marking of wrecks a discretionary matter."
The court noted that the suit came under the SIA, which does
not have a discretionary function exception, and found "no basis
upon which [to] import the many exceptions in the Tort Claims
61. 451 F.2d at 145. The court specifically stated:
It would be incongruous to impute to Congress a purpose to perpetuate confusion, not by reason of choosing the wrong forum, but by importing substantive
standards of liability and governmental defenses by a retrospective analysis of
what would have been the case prior to 1960. Reimportation of FTCA provisions or exceptions produces obviously unintended and irrational distinctions.
Id. at 145-46 (citations omitted). Despite this reasoning, the court did not find the government liable for plaintiff's damages. The government's duty to plaintiff was limited in
time; this duty terminated at the time a prudent ship owner/navigator would have reasonably received the notice of faulty charts. Thus, principles of tort law protected the
government from liability that it had in fact caused. Id. at 149.
62. 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975).
63. Id. at 176-77. Testimony at trial revealed that the barge had been in that location about five years. During each of those five years, eight to ten boats had collided with
it. Despite notices and requests over the years, the Army Corps of Engineers had not
removed or marked the wreck. Id. at 177. Plaintiff alleged that this failure to take adequate precautions led to plaintiff's damages. Id. After this incident, a marine surveyor,
employed by plaintiff's insurer, examined the area and requested the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Coast Guard to take appropriate measures. Eventually some agency
put up a marker. Id.
64. Id. at 177-79. Under 14 U.S.C. § 86 (1976), "The Secretary [of Transportation]
may mark for the protection of navigation any sunken vessel or other obstruction
existing on the navigable waters or waters above the continental shelf of the United
States in such manner and for so long as, in his judgment, the needs of maritime navigation require." (emphasis added).
The statute's current wording is a result of a 1965 amendment; the prior act made
such markings mandatory on the Coast Guard's part. 529 F.2d at 177. The amendment
was designed to eliminate any confusion as to who should deal with these wrecks, giving
the Coast Guard discretion to mark or remove them if the owner did not. S. REP. No.
688, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.Nzws, 3140, 3140.
Detailed regulations pertaining to the Coast Guard's duties in connection with maritime
navigational aids are found in 33 C.F.R. §§ 60.01-1 to 72.05-10. See also Annot., 19
A.L.R. FED. 297 (1974).
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Act into the Suits in Admiralty Act."as Because there was no
discretionary function exception to immunize the Coast Guard's
failure, the court remanded for a determination of whether the
government had negligently failed to mark this particular
wreck."e The court recognized that this discretion was to be
exercised reasonably and with due care; the Coast Guard could
not ignore real and substantial threats to navigation and still
hide behind the cloak of discretion.2 The Fourth Circuit
reaffirmed this reasoning in dictum in Doyle v. United States, 8
65. 529 F.2d at 179.
66. Id. at 180. The court rejected the lower court's determination that the United
States' duty to mark or remove wrecks abandoned by the owners was mandatory in light
of the 1965 amendment to the Wreck Acts. These Acts allowed the agency to use its
discretion in determining which wrecks actually were hazardous. This determination had
to be exercised reasonably and with due care. Id. at 178-79. The court could not determine from the records whether the agency had reasonably exercised its authority and
thus remanded to the lower court. Id. at 180. The reviewing court found the Coast
Guard's duty not satisfied solely by the National Oceanic Atmospheric and Administration's publication of a chart with a wreck symbol representing the sunken barge, because
the Wrecks Acts required some physical manifestation on the scene. Id.
67. Id. at 179.
68. 441 F. Supp. 701 (D.S.C. 1977). The Coast Guard actions that led to plaintiff's
cause of action involved a ferry cable crossing a canal, on which the deceased was operating his boat. The cable was part of a ferry cable system; when the ferry was in operation,
the cable became taut and rose several feet above the water. Signs placed up- and downstream warned mariners of the ferry's existence but not the potential danger. Id. at 705.
The deceased's estate brought this action to recover for his death caused by collision
with the cable. Although the Coast Guard did not own or operate the ferry, it had noted
it on charts and publications and had reason to know of the danger. Id. at 708. In addition, it had received complaints but had taken no action. Again, the court found the
discretionary function exception inapplicable to the SIA under which the suit was
brought. Id. at 708-09. The court found the government liable for its abuse of discretion
in failing to adequately notify mariners of the danger. Id. at 709. A recent Fourth Circuit
case relieved the government of liability. In Magno v. Corros, 630 F.2d 224 (1980), plaintiff initiated suit at the district court level. 439 F. Supp. 592 (D.S.C. 1977). Plaintiff was
injured in the decedent's boat when it collided with a dike built by the United States.
Plaintiff sued decedent's estate; the estate impleaded the United States and the Exxon
Corporation, seeking indemnity. 439 F. Supp. at 595. The court held that the United
States had not only the authority to construct the dike, 33 U.S.C. § 403, but also the
discretion to decide whether to mark it. Id. at 599. Once, however, it decided to light the
dike, it had to exercise its discretion reasonably under the precepts of Indian Towing Co.
v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). The court rejected the government's argument that
its lighting was within the discretionary function exception because the exception was
not to be implied into the SIA. 439 F. Supp. at 599-600. Given this premise, the court
examined the sufficiency of the lighting and found the solitary light "grossly negligent
and . . . a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 604. But, because of plaintiff's awareness of
the dike, the court applied a comparative negligence standard. Id. at 605. Despite the
fact that this language deals with the implementation rather than the actual policy-making, it supports the theory that the discretionary function exception is not part of the
SIA. The government appealed the lower court decision and prevailed. 630 F.2d 224 (4th
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again refusing to imply the FTCA exceptions into the SIA.6
This case differs from Gercey and Lane in that it involves negligent implementation of a policy decision rather than a negligent
policy judgment itself. 0 Under the Supreme Court holding in
Indian Towing Co. v. United States,71 negligent implementation
is not protected by the discretionary function exception; only
policy decisions themselves fall within that protected category. 2
Once an agency decides to act, it leaves the protected zone of
the discretionary function exception and must act reasonably

and with due care.73 Thus, although the Doyle court faced a neg-

ligent implementation case, it did uphold Lane's finding that the

exceptions and that the Fourth
SIA did not contain the FTCA
74
Circuit did not recognize any.

Cir. 1980). The Court of Appeals held that the government has no duty to provide additional lighting at the dike. 630 F.2d at 228. The court distinguished Lane on two
grounds: (1) 14 U.S.C. § 86, while applicable in Lane, was inapplicable in Magno because
it involved a dike, and not an obstruction which § 86 covers; and (2) assuming § 86 was
applicable, there was still no duty to mark the dike more clearly than it was in the first
place. Id. at 228-29. It must be noted, however, that this court did not discuss the discretionary function exception nor its possible application to the SIA. Thus, the district
court's discussion on this issue was not explicitly overturned on appeal.
69. Assuming arguendo that Doyle had found a discretionary function exception in
the SIA, or good reasons for implying one, it still would have found the government
responsible because the actions that led to the injuries were not within the discretionary
function exception's scope. See note 68 supra.
70. See notes 67-68 supra and notes 71-73 and accompanying text infra.
71. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). Plaintiff sought recovery under the FTCA for damages
caused by the negligence of the Coast Guard in its maintenance of a lighthouse it had
previously decided to establish to aid mariners. Id. at 62. Plaintiff claimed the government was negligent in failing to keep the lighthouse in good working order, thus inducing
public reliance. Plaintiff asserted that this failure was the cause of its grounding and
subsequent damage to its cargo. Id. Specific acts of negligence included the Coast
Guard's failure to check the battery and sun relay system, the failure of one of its officers
to check the lighthouse, the failure to repair the light or give a warning it was not operational and there was a loose connection that could have been discovered upon proper
inspection. Id.
72. Id. at 69. The court stated:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered
reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care
to make certain that the light was kept in good working order; and if the light
did become extinguished, then the Coast Guard was further obligated to use
due care to discover this fact and to repair the light or give warning that it was
not functioning. If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and damage was thereby
caused to petitioners, the United States is liable under the Tort Claims Act.
Id.
73. Id. See also Afran Transp. Co. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
74. See note 68 supra.
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The most recent case in opposition to the Gercey and
Bearce line came from a district court in the Fifth Circuit. In
Offshore Transport Corp. v. United States,7 plaintiff sought
recovery for damages incurred when its vessels struck charted
but unmarked objects.7 6 Given the natural hazards of the area,
the Coast Guard had decided not to mark the submerged
objects." The court, relying on De Bardeleben and Lane, denied
the importation of the FTCA exceptions into the SIA.75 While
the court did recognize that the Coast Guard's duty to mark or
remove wrecks was discretionary rather than mandatory, given
the limited agency resources,7 the agency was forced to concentrate its efforts on frequently traveled areas where the
probability of accidents was greatest. 80 Since the court refused
to imply the FTCA exceptions in this SIA action, this element of
discretion was not immune from judicial inquiry into its reasonableness. The court, in determining whether the Coast Guard's
actions were reasonable, examined and weighed the evidence the

agency presented81 and concluded that the Coast Guard had met

75. 465 F. Supp. 976 (D. La. 1979).
76. Id. at 977-78. Two of plaintiff's boats sustained damage upon collision with a
submerged object. The first boat struct a stainless steel shaft lying six inches below the
water's surface and sustained substantial hull damage. Id. at 977. Following this incident, the Coast Guard was notified of the first boat's sinking. Nearly three months later,
a second boat was damaged while attempting to locate the cause of the first accident. At
that time, the wreck was still unmarked despite notification of its location and danger.
Id. at 978.
77. Id. at 978. The government cited several factors it considered in determining
whether to mark this or any wreck or submerged object: location of the wreck, its size,
the depth of the water, and the area's navigational patterns. Id. These factors, during a
physical inspection of the wreck area, determined whether the object posed a hazard to
navigation and thus whether the agency would take any action. Id.
78. Id. at 981.
79. Id. at 980. The court used the Coast Guard Act of 1949, 14 U.S.C. § 86 (1976) as
a guideline. The court recognized that the Coast Guard's duty is discretionary, and thus,
the real issue presented was whether the Coast Guard had abused its discretionary
authority to protect vessels by neither marking the objects nor removing them. Id.
80. Id. The court stated:
It is uncontroverted that the resources of both agencies [Coast Guard and
Army Corps of Engineers] are not adequate to remove or properly mark every
wreck throughout the Gulf of Mexico. Therefore both agencies concentrate
their efforts on those waters known to be frequented by vessels and where the
threat to navigation is deemed to be the greatest.
Id.
81. Both the Coast Guard and Army Corps of Engineers presented evidence for the
basis of their decision in regard to the area. Chiefs of both agencies stated that mariners
generally avoid this (Shell Key) area given the plethora of natural hazards, shallow
waters, shoals, and a coral reef. Id. at 978. The primary factor in determining whether to
take any affirmative action was the estimated traffic pattern in the vicinity. Id. This area
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the "needs of maritime navigation" and thus had not acted negligently."' Through careful analysis and by giving deference to
agency expertise, the court demonstrated its competence in scrutinizing agency decisions. The fact that a policy decision was
involved did not constrain the Offshore court from examining
the agency decision not to act.
The First and Seventh Circuits argue that the discretionary
function exception plays a vital role in government operations
because agencies must be free to use their discretion in allocating limited resources, and also that interferences with this function will greatly impair government operations.83 Although not
explicitly stated, this line of reasoning assumes that, given the
opportunity, the courts continually will overturn administrative
decisions. This is simply not the case. Courts pay great deference to agency decisions and will reach a contrary determination
only if they find the agency action an abuse of the agency's discretion." Thus, the scope of judicial review of agency actions is
was removed from the usual traveled channels the Coast Guard maintained. Although
the Army Corps of Engineers did visit the area, the Coast Guard did not; it relied on a
map survey in evaluating the use of the area. Id. Neither agency conducted its own traffic studies, nor did they conduct periodic traffic studies to determine whether conditions
had changed. Id.
82. Despite the actions taken by the two agencies, as well as actions the agencies
could have taken but did not take, the court found the failure to take affirmative steps in
this area regarding the submerged objects was not an abuse of the discretion vested in
the agencies because the evidence substantiated the reasonableness of their decision. Id.
at 980. The court found the government's duty to exercise due care satisfied and thus
there was no breach of the duty owed to the plaintiff. Id. at 982. The Coast Guard, upon
notification of the first accident, issued a notice to mariners of the wreck area and
advised them to use caution when traveling in the area. Id. at 978. In fact, plaintiff's
experienced masters testified that Shell Key was generally avoided and that, but for the
urgings of the vessel's charterer to take that course, they would not have done so given
the natural hazards. Id. at 979. There was also no evidence that the plaintiff or the charterer notified the Coast Guard of its intent to take that route nor that they had
requested action in that area. Id. This combination of factors persuaded the court to find
the government not negligent.
83. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra.
84. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Judge Bazelon stated for the courtFor many years, courts have treated administrative policy decisions with great
deference, confining judicial attention primarily to matters of procedure. On
matters of substance, the courts regularly upheld agency action, with a nod in
the direction of the "substantial evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of
administrative expertise.
Id. at 597. It should be noted, however, that Judge Bazelon went on to say this deference
in the extreme may be changing, especially when administrative actions affect fundamental personal interests in life, health, and liberty. Id. at 597-98. To protect these vital
interests, Bazelon felt that it was even more crucial that these decisions be given "strict
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limited and rarely do courts find the agency's decision totally

unreasonable.88 Courts respect agency expertise. So long as there
is evidence that the agency's decision was reasonable and within

the bounds of its discretion, the courts will uphold the agency's

judgment8s
Another concern underlying the First and Seventh Circuits'
approach is that the separation of powers established by the
Constitution proscribes judicial review of agency decisions. The
framers of the Constitution, however, never intended the separation of powers to be absolute and inflexible.8 7 The powers are
intermixed; there are numerous overlaps of powers in the three
branches that blur these neatly divided categories.8 8 A classical
example of this mixture of powers is the administrative agency.8s
Nowhere does the Constitution provide for administrative agencies, yet they are recognized today as a vital part of the governjudicial scrutiny." Id. at 598. See also L JAM, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 565-66 (1965).
85. B. SCHWARTZ, ADmINISrLTvH LAw (1976). Schwartz says there are two reasons
why the scope of judicial review is narrow. One reason is the deference given to the
expertise of the administrative expert. This deference limits the extent to which the
expert's discretion is scrutinized by a less qualified judge. Id. at 580. The alternative to
this deference is that the judge will overrule an administrative decision based on technical matters within the agency's expertise. The second reason for the limited scope is
based on a pragmatic concern: time. Courts' calendars are so full that courts simply do
not have the time to investigate and come to their own evaluations on scientific and
technical matters. Id.
86. See notes 76-83 and accompanying text supra.
87. GUNTHER, supra note 46, at 400.
88. Id. Gunther points to the relationship between the President and the legislature.
The President becomes a participant in the legislative process through his veto powers;
conversely, Congress can limit the President through exercise of its impeachment power.
These restraints are authorized by the Constitution. As Gunther notes, these ambiguous
areas have created competition among the branches that often are resolved by political
forces dominant during certain time periods. Id.
89. See Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976). The foundation of federal administrative law, it authorizes
federal agencies to publish information, rules, opinions, orders, and public records
through the Federal Registry, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), permits agencies to issue rules relating to a number of subjects, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976), and to engage in adjudications provided certain procedural guidelines are followed, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976). The Act (APA)
grants agencies the authority to issue subpoenas to compel attendance at agency proceedings, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1976); hold hearings so that the public may voice its opinions, 5
U.S.C. § 556 (1976); and impose sanctions, determine when licenses shall issue and when
these licenses are suspended, revoked, or expired, 5 U.S.C. § 558 (1976). The vast
amount of law that comes from these agencies, as reflected in the numerous volumes of
the Code of Federal Regulations, as wel as the safeguards Congress enacted to ensure
the proper exercise of administrative authority, shows how much the agencies contribute
to the workings of the government and the power they exert.
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ment. e° They perform roles traditionally delegated to the other
branches; they resemble legislatures in their rule-making capacity and act as courts in their adjudicative capacity.9 1 Thus, the
more appropriate inquiry is the extent to which one branch
interferes with another." Because the judiciary was intended to
oversee the other branches of the government," judicial review
90. See Loevinger, The Administrative Agency as a Paradigm of Government-A
Survey of the Administrative Process,40 IND. L.J. 287 (1965). Loevinger finds the most
telling aspect of the agency's contribution is the sheer volume of work it does. As far
back as 1964, the workload of certain agencies was awesome. For example, during 1964,
the Civil Aeronautics Board handled 66,966 applications received or proceedings initiated; the Federal Communications Commission received 961,041 applications, received
38,241 interference complaints, and investigated 21,803 interference cases, and made
14,468 inspections; and the Federal Trade Commission received 5,889 applications for
complaints, issued 311 complaints, secured 416 assurances of discontinuances, received
1,800 requests for advice and opinions, issued 57,310 interpretations just under the Wool,
Fur and Textile Acts, and made 11,837 inspections. Id. at 299-300. The list could go on
indefinitely, but these samples, which have doubtless increased over the years, indicate
the awesome power these agencies exert and the impact they have on the public. Much
of this work could not be accomplished through the often slow and ineffective congressional process. Thus, agencies are valued for their flexibility, efficiency, and time saving
aspects. See also B. SCHWARTZ, ADmImismATnv LAW: A CASEBOOK (1977). Schwartz
states:
[T]he State has had to bring ever-increasing parts of the population directly
under its fostering guardianship. The representative legislative assembly is
peculiarly inappropriate itself to perform these continuous tasks of regulation
and guardianship. It has had to delegate their performance to the administrative process. Indeed, the need for an effective instrument through which these
tasks could be performed has been perhaps the primary reason for the growth
of that process.
Id. at 75.
91. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMImSTRATIvE LAW (1976). The author states:
Administrative agencies typically have both legislative and judicial powers concentrated in them. They have authority to issue rules and regulations which
have the force of law (power that is legislative in nature) and authority to
decide cases (power that is judicial in nature). It is through its exercise of rulemaking and adjudicatory authority that the administrative agency is able to
determine private rights and obligations. . . . [R]ule-making and adjudication
are the substantive weapons in the administrative armory.
Id. at 7.
92. See Gunther, supra note 46, at 401.
93. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 135 (1803). This landmark case established judicial review as an axiom of the American legal system. It was the Supreme
Court's first elaborate statement of its judicial review powers; its reasoning is alive today.
GuNTHER, supra note 46, at 1. In dealing with the powers and limitations of the legislature, the court stated, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each." Id. at 10. The court oversees both executive and
legislative branches; since the administrative branch is part of the executive branch, it
too is subject to the courts' scrutiny.
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of administrative agencies, if limited, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
The First and Seventh Circuits also ignore the effect of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),' 4 which provides for judicial review of administrative actions. The purpose of the APA
was to give the aggrieved person access to judicial review9 5 and
to insure administrators would not abuse the discretion Congress granted them." The provisions for judicial review were
merely codifications of existing common law.9 7 The APA permits
review of all relevant questions of law, interpretation of statutory and constitutional provisions, and agency determination of
the meaning/applicability of statutory terms to specific factual
settings.9 Following such review, the court is directed to "hold
unlawful and set aside agency actions, findings and conclusions
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or other94. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976). Section 704 provides that "agency action made
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." Id. § 704.
95. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) states: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." This notion is reflected in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The Court faced a challenge by a group of
drug manufacturers of the FDA's requirement that drugs bearing proprietary names also
carry the "established name." Id. at 137-39. In determining whether the Commissioner of
the FDA exceeded his authority in issuing regulations designed to implement the statute,
the Court first stated that the APA embodied the presumption of judicial review to one
suffering a legal wrong because of agency action. Id. at 140. Citing Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S.
367 (1962), the Court found that courts should restrict access to judicial review only
upon a showing of "clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent." Id. at
141.
96. Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1975). In examining the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare's decision not to reopen applications made by the
plaintiff for disability benefits, the court held that the district court could review agency
decisions, but found the Secretary had not abused his authority. Id. at 1007, 1017. The
court also recognized the need for limited judicial review to keep administrators in line.
d. at 1009. For remedies used when an abuse of discretion is found, see note 99 infra.
97. See DAvis, supra note 1, at § 28.03. Davis notes that during the twentieth century, the courts began to recognize a presumption of reviewability as opposed to the
prior presumption that there could be no review unless specifially authorized by law. Id.
§ 28.02. Thus, on its face, the APA made no change in the law of reviewability. As stated
by the Attorney General's Manual on the APA, "The intended result of the introductory
clause of section 10 is to restate the existing law as to the area of reviewable action." Id.
§ 28.03.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976) provides: "To the extent necessary to decision and when
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning and applicability of the
terms of an agency action."
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wise not in accordance with law."9 9 While the statute limits judicial review, courts should resolve any question of the APA's
applicability in favor of judicial review.10 0
99. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). The APA allows, indeed mandates, that the reviewing
court shall:
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law,
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
There are, however, limitations on judicial review under the APA. Section 701 states
that these provisions are inapplicable to the extent that a statute precludes judicial
review or when agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701
(1976). The question is whether this latter exception should be construed to immunize
action committed to agency discretion from all judicial review. Kenneth Davis, a
renowned commentator on administrative law, feels that if a decision is committed to
agency discretion, a reviewing court may not examine the decision even for an abuse of
that discretion. See DAVIs, supra note 1, at § 28.05. Professor Jaffe, however, argues that
the APA permits limited review to determine whether the agency has exercised its discretion within bounds. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 359-63
(1965). Accord, Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness:A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 9651006 (1969).
The court in Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971), reviewed both theories
and chose the Jaffe/Berger approach, thus examining whether an abuse of discretion was
present in the decision to deny compensation to an Indian attorney. One final authority
on this issue supports the proposition that § 701 was not meant to immunize agency
action committed to agency discretion from all judicial review. Schwartz and Wade state:
Such an interpretation [immunizing decisions from judicial review] ignores the
traditional prohibition against arbitrary and unreasonable exercises of discretionary authority. When the A.P.A. speaks of action committed by law to
agency discretion, it means discretion to act reasonably-an interpretation that
is confirmed by the provision, already quoted, of section 10(e) giving the
reviewing court power to reverse for abuse of discretion. If the exception for
action committed to agency discretion is read to immunize discretion however
arbitrarily exercised, it reduces this part of section 10(e) to mere nonsense.
How can a court reverse for abuse of discretion if exercises of discretionary
power are not subject to review at all?
B. SCHWARTZ AND H.W.R. WADE, LEGAL CONROL OF GovERNmENr. ADMNmisTRATwvE LAW
IN BRITAIN AND THE UNrrzD SrATEs 262 (1972) (citations omitted).
100. See Sierra Club v. Bergland, 451 F. Supp. 120 (1978). Plaintiffs brought an
action against the government seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt the proposed improvement plans on the Tippah River Watershed. Id. at 122. In determining the
reviewability of the agency's decision, the court cited Citizens To Preserve Overton Park
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Although this Act does not include judicial review of suits
asking for money damages for negligence, 1"' it does allow equitable remedies, such as compelling an agency to act or enjoining
the agency from implementing a decision. 10 2 These APA reme-

dies are no more intrusive and disruptive to agency activities
than requiring the agency to pay money to injured individuals;
in fact, they may be more burdensome and a greater interference
with that branch's autonomy. The courts have not interpreted
the APA's permission of judicial review as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 103 Given this source of direct judicial
review of agency actions, courts should also be entitled to review
actions in the context of personal and property damages without
violating separation of powers. This is especially true because
the courts, as a practical matter, pay great deference to agency
expertise and look only for abuses of discretion.'"
Another underlying rationale for the First and Seventh Circuits' approach is the detrimental effect such liability would
have on the public treasury. The Supreme Court dismissed such
an argument in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States.105 The Court,
dealing with the FTCA, noted that Congress knew losses due to
government action would be compensated through public treasury funds, but saw greater injustice in allowing the entire burden to fall on the injured individual.'" Because the cost is
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), for the proposition that any conflict between § 701(a)(2)
and § 706(2)(A) of the APA must be resolved in favor of judicial review. The Supreme
Court found that the exception disallowing review of agency action because it has been
committed to agency discretion is very narrow; only reasonably exercised discretion
could be committed to a federal agency. Id. at 123.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) provides in part:
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted
or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not
be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that is against the
United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.
(emphasis added).
102. Id. § 706. See note 99 supra.
103. The acceptance of the APA and judicial review of agency decisions is reflected
not only at the federal level but at the state level as well. Most states have enacted
administrative procedure legislation, most being based on the Model State Administrative Procedure Act. SCHWARTZ, supra note 90, at 4-5. The focus has shifted from the law
that these agencies promulgate to the administrative process itself. Thus, there is greater
examination of the use of agency powers and less questioning of the powers themselves.
Id.
104. See note 85 supra.
105. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
106. In Rayonier, plaintiffs sued for their losses sustained by reason of the United
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spread out among the taxpayers, the resulting burden on the
government is slight. 107 Thus, fears of government insolvency are
groundless: this burden would harm the government only if it
were so crushing that "it reflected the wholesale destruction of
the social wealth in a way that would spell a breakdown for any

system of liability."108 If the burden on the treasury is indeed so

great, Congress has the option of amending the SIA, thus shielding the government from broad liability.
Although the First and Seventh Circuits' claim that agency
inaction results when courts review administrative actions, judicial review, in fact, fosters agency action. According to the First

and Seventh Circuits, given budgetary constraints, agencies need
the protection of the discretionary function exception in policy
matters so that they can operate efficiently without time consuming, needless interference from other governmental
branches. 109 These circuits, however, follow Indian Towing Co.

v. United States,110 which holds that once an agency does act, it

has to do so reasonably."" These agency actions, taken pursuant
to the decision to act, are not protected by the discretionary
function exception but are subject to traditional negligence standards.1 1 2 Only the policy judgment itself, negligent or otherwise,
is protected. " Thus, the only time agencies are protected by

this exception from judicial review and possible liability is when
States Forest Service's negligence in fighting a forest fire. Congress recognized that when
it enacted the the Federal Tort Claims Act, it was waiving traditional comprehensive
immunity and taking on "novel and unprecedented" liability that would inevitably put a
strain on the public treasury. Id. at 319. Thus, despite the immense liability the United
States could be subjected to, especially in this case where hundreds of square miles of
trees were destroyed by one fire, Congress nevertheless found it would be unfair for individuals to bear the entire burden since the public benefited from the services provided
by the government's employees. Id. at 320. See note 52 supra.
107. 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957).
108. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 21, at § 29.15. The authors, in examining the
question of whether it is desirable to compensate injuries out of public funds, note the
trend toward compensating losses and distributing the losses. Id.
Even conservatives would do this [compensation] where the victim is innocent,
where his injury is of a kind already recognized in private tort law, and where
there is fault in conducting the enterprise. The device of government liability
offers machinery for both compensation and distribution; it should be used to
compensate the victims of government ....
Id.
109. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
110. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
111. 350 U.S. at 69.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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they exercise their discretion in deciding upon inaction. Assuming agencies try to avoid defending themselves in lawsuits, incurring time, expense and delays, the best approach is to decide not
to develop and implement experimental programs that could
possibly cause personal and/or property damage. Courts will not
review this decision to do nothing, even if circumstances indicate
public demand for such programs and imminent public injury
without them. Inevitably, agency inaction will result, leading to
inefficient, unproductive agency operations, and depriving the
public of beneficial programs that agencies are authorized and
best equipped to provide. Therefore, the discretionary function
exception does not meet the goals the First and Seventh Circuits
wish to further.
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits' reasoning is more persuasive
than that of the First and Seventh. On its face, the SIA as
amended does not limit its general waiver of sovereign immunity.1" ' Its legislative history also discloses no express congressional intent to limit the waiver. 1"' According to the Senate
Report on the 1960 amendments, one purpose of the amendments was to prevent future misfilings in the wrong forum due
to ambiguous jurisdictional language in the SIA. 11 6 To accomplish this, the amendments permitted the free transfer of cases
between district courts and the Court of Claims. 117 This solution, however, dealt solely with the symptom and not the source
of confusion because it only provided a remedy for misfilings but
failed to eliminate the very reason for the misfilings: ambiguous
statutory language. Thus, in an effort to clarify the statute's
applicability, Congress added a third section eliminating the
requirement that the claim involve government merchant vessels
114. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). See note 15 supra.
115. See S. REP. No. 1894, 86 Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3583, supra note 12.
116. Id.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(c) (1976) provides:
If a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is filed in a
district court, the district court shall, if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case to the Court of Claims, where the case shall proceed as if it had been
filed in the Court of Claims on the date it was filed in the district court.
28 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976) provides:
If a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts is filed in the
Court of Claims, the Court of Claims shall, if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district court in which it would have been brought at
the time such case was filed, where the case shall proceed as if it had been filed
in the district court on the date it was filed in the Court of Claims.
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or cargo. 118 Given the problems in determining what a merchant
vessel or cargo was, Congress revised § 742 to allow all maritime
claims against the government and not just those that could be
identified as "merchant"-based. The effect was a substantial
enlargement of governmental liability because plaintiff did not
have to base his claim on whether a government vessel or cargo
was involved; so long as the government was in some way
responsible for plaintiff's injury on navigable waters, plaintiff
could sue the government. Because Congress' purpose was to
clear up the courts' and the public's confusion in interpreting
the SIA, it seems unlikely that it would defer the determination
of whether there were any limits to this broad waiver to the
courts when it could have done so at the time the amendments
were enacted. Congress earlier had imposed limits on the FTCA
and easily could have explicitly included such provisions in its
amendment to the SIA. Although legislative history is unclear
on this point, the fact that Congress did not so limit the SIA
expressly implies that it made a conscious decision, considering
its past experience with the FTCA, not to incorporate the discretionary function exception into the SIA.11'9
The current disapproval of the sovereign immunity concept,
inducing many courts to resolve doubts as to waivers of immunity against the government,1 20 lends additional support to the
assertion that the SIA's waiver of immunity is unconditional.
The De Bardeleben court, citing Gulf Oil v. Panama Canal
118. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). See note 15 supra.
119. Although this may be a "negative pregnant" argument, the fact that Congress
did not provide for the exception, either expressly or by reference in the legislative history, is at least circumstantial evidence that it did not consider any of the FTCA exceptions necessary or applicable to the SIA.
120. See De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971).
The De Bardeleben court noted that the "tide of history is running clearly against the
concept of sovereign immunity" and that this disfavor goes back as far as 1939 with
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939). 451 F.2d at 146. In
Keifer, a Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation, chartered by the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, sought to determine whether it was immune from suit as a governmental corporation. 306 U.S. at 387. The Court stated that "the government does not
become the conduit of its immunity in suits against its agency merely because they do its
work." Id. at 388. Noting the current climate against governmental immunity, the court
found the governmental corporation amenable to suit despite the absence of an express
"sue and be sued" clause in the corporation's charter. Id. at 390-991. The De Bardeleben
court also noted that this "assault upon the citadel of immunity continues presently
apace." 451 F.2d at 146, referring to Gulf Oil Corp. v. Panama Canal Co., 407 F.2d 24
(5th Cir. 1969).
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Co., 1 stated that in interpreting the SIA and FTCA, which
expose the government to almost unlimited liability, the correct
judicial approach is to construe the waiver sensibly and with the
Act's purpose in mind. 12 2 Avoiding restrictive interpretations
prohibits importing any unintended exceptions into a broad
waiver of immunity, thereby promoting the very purpose of
waiving sovereign immunity, which is to afford relief to those
injured by governmental activities in the maritime world and to
place the burden on the party best able to prevent or shoulder
the costs. Earlier Supreme Court decisions, holding that broad
statutory language authorizing suit should not be thwarted by
unduly restrictive interpretations, 2 8 also support this liberal
interpretation of the SIA waiver. Given these interpretations
favoring unlimited waivers of immunity, courts should construe
similarly the SIA's broad waiver of immunity without tacking on
exceptions Congress never mentioned in amending the statute.
A further reason for disallowing the importation of the discretionary function exception into the SIA is that courts are
competent to review administrative agency actions. Courts often
deal with complex scientific and technical matters, examples
121. 407 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1969).
122. Id. at 28. The court dealt with an action brought by a vessel owner against the
Panama Canal Company for damages incurred when the boat scraped ground while
being piloted by the defendant's vessel through the Canal. Id. at 27. The company, a
government corporate entity, defended on the ground that waivers of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. The court found this defense untenable and outmoded,
preferring a more sensible interpretation of such waivers. Id. at 28. In conclusion, the
court stated:
A reasonable interpretation produces a reasonable result. An unreasonable
interpretation produces a harsh absurdity. We put ourselves on the side of reason and if, with like reason, the shipowner brings itself within these principles,
there is no more obstacle to the Panama Canal Company's carrying the burden, as it concededly does, for tortious damage caused by one of its vessels to a
longshoreman on a New York pier.
Id. at 32.
123. See, e.g., Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945) (brought
under the Public Vessels Act, § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1976)). Plaintiff alleged that damages
to his vessel were due to the United States' negligent operation of a public vessel. Id. at
216. Defendant argued that the PVA be narrowly read to apply only to cases where a
public vessel was the physical instrumentality by which the damage is done. Id. at 21617. This was not the situation in Canadian Aviator; plaintiff there followed a naval
patrol boat after being notified by the naval authorities that he was to be escorted into
port. It was at that time that the vessel ran into a submerged wreck. Thus, it was the
wreck and not the public vessel that caused the actual damage. Id. at 217. Nevertheless,
the Court read the PVA broadly, finding a narrow reading that limited the Act's relief to
be unjustifiable, and thus reversed the lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit. Id. at
229.
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being medical malpractice cases and products liability cases.
With expert testimony, judges and juries are quite capable of
digesting volumes of complicated materials and rendering just,
well-reasoned decisions. The Offshore and Lane courts demonstrate the courts' ability to examine maritime agency decisions
not to take certain actions despite the fact that the subject matter is within the agency's expertise. If the courts do review
agency decisions under the SIA, the government will not inevitably lose. In Offshore, the court found the agency's decision not
to adopt certain measures in the accident area reasonable in
light of surrounding circumstances.' 2 4 The Lane court displayed
its confidence in the lower court's competence by remanding for
further consideration of the agency's actions. 125 Effective judicial
review of government actions prevents undesirable agency inaction that the discretionary function exception fosters; so long as
the government exercises its discretion soundly in making policy
judgments, the courts will not find them negligent.'
Thus,
responsible agency operations are encouraged, ultimately benefitting the SIA's intended beneficiary, the public.
Because it encourages agencies to act responsibly, the
Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts' approach disallowing importation of the discretionary function exception into the SIA should
be followed. There is a much stronger basis for not implying the
FTCA exceptions into the SIA: the SIA's wording, its legislative
history, proper statutory interpretation favoring absolute
waivers of sovereign immunity, and more equitable results for
injured parties. Despite the 1960 amendments to the SIA, which
subjects the government to extensive liability, government operations continue to run efficiently without the discretionary function exception. Courts such as Offshore have little difficulty
applying basic tort principles to most admiralty cases. Thus,
there is no need to employ the discretionary function exception
to protect government agencies. The split in the Courts of
124. For a discussion of how the court reached this decision, see notes 77-82 supra.
125. See notes 63-67 supra.
126. Basic tort principles still operate to protect the government from unlimited
liability. In De Bardeleben, for example, the Coast Guard owed a duty to plaintiff but
did not breach that duty since it was terminated at the time a prudent shipowner would
have reasonably received the Notice to Mariner which warned the public of the correct
situation. 451 F.2d 140, 149 (5th Cir. 1971). Thus, the plaintiff, in suits against the
United States under the SIA, is still bound by the tort principles of any private litigant
and must carry the burden of proof in demonstrating the government agencies'
negligence.
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Appeal remains, however, and until resolved by the Supreme
Court or Congress, plaintiffs and the government will remain
unsure whether the discretionary function exception provides a
safe harbor for the government's negligence in maritime cases.
Given the arguments posed by both sides, the uncertainty
should be resolved in favor of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits'
approach.
Kathryn C. Nielsen

